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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
be one of trust and confidence. It would be detrimental to such
a relationship for the patient to question the doctor's every action
at the moment of execution.
Courts in the first and second departments have recently
employed this exception in attorney malpractice suits.5 In the
first department case of Wilson v. Econom,6 suit was brought
against an attorney when it was discovered that he had failed
to institute the plaintiff's action within the short one year and
thirty day period of limitations applicable to suits against the
Transit Authority. The attorney's office repeatedly assured the
plaintiff that his case was proceeding properly. A Bar Asso-
ciation investigation subsequently revealed a contrary state of
affairs.
In the second department a similar situation arose in Siegel
v. Kranis,7 but the appellate division, in deciding the case, gave
no indication that it was aware of the prior treatment of the
problem in Wilson. The malpractice suit arose from a failure
to file a timely MVAIC claim. In both cases the courts felt
that the similarity of a doctor-patient and an attorney-client
relationship was more than superficial. Both necessitate continued
trust, confidence and attention.
With sound authority in two departments for an extension of
the "continuing practice" theory, a malpractice suit can not now
be evaded by merely giving a client meaningless reassurances or
by futile attempts to remedy the situation.
APTICLE 3 -JURISDICTION AND SERvicE, APPEARANCE AND CHOICE
OF COURT
CPLR 302(a)(1): Making promissory note payable in New York
not deemed a transaction of business here.
The appellate division, first department, in Wirth v. Prenyls
recently held that personal jurisdiction will not be obtained in
New York by merely making a promissory note payable here.
In Wirth, the underlying contract involved the shipment of ma-
chinery from the United Kingdom, by the plaintiff, a New York
resident, to the defendant, an Argentine domiciliary. Disputes
under the contract were to be arbitrated by the Argentine Stock
Exchange. Suing on the promissory note alone, plaintiff sought
5 It is especially significant to note the second department's use of the
theory, for it, originally, was somewhat restrictive even in the medical area.
Borgia v. City of New York, 16 App. Div. 2d 927i 229 N.Y.S.2d 318(2d Dep't), rezfd, 12 N.Y2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1962).656 Misc. 2d 272, 288 N.Y.S.2d 381 (Sup. Ct N.Y. County 1968).
729 App. Div. 2d 447, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831 (2d Dep't 1968).829 App. Div. 2d 373, 288 NY.52d 377 (1st Dep't 1968).
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jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a) (1) by alleging that the pro-
vision for making the note payable in New York constituted the
transaction of business here. The court ruled that, although
the note was delivered, completed, made payable and had its
payment refused in New York, these facts were insufficient
in themselves to confer jurisdiction in New York.
The court noted that payment was to be made here through
a New York bank but delivery of the note to it for completion
and eventual payment was intended only as an accommodation
to the plaintiff to enable him to avoid Argentine taxes. This
procedure was not chosen so that the defendants could avail
themselves of New York law nor did commercial benefit accrue
to the defendants by making the notes payable in New York.
The major part of the commercial dealing was intended to be
conducted in Argentina.
The decision seems to be commendable, since a contrary
holding would mean that any party could become subject to
personal jurisdiction in New York with no more substantial
contact than paying or receiving payment of a debt through
a New York commercial institution. Moreover, the decision
prevents two parties with no other contacts with New York
except banking facilities from choosing New York as their forum
by simply making their notes payable here. Thus, a potential
avenue of forum shopping is foreclosed.
CPLR 302(a)(1), CCA §404(a).: Placement of telephone order
for goods with New York domiciliary not deemed a transaction
of business here.
Section 404(a) of the New York City Civil Court Act
parallels CPLR 302 (a) (1). 9  As with 302, personal juris-
diction is predicated upon the defendant's contacts with the
jurisdiction and the federally imposed limitations based upon
"fair play and substantial justice" '' control both sections."'
A recent case, Katz & Son Billiards Products, Inc. v. Correale
& Sons, Inc.,12 interpreting the "transacts business" section of
929A McKm -V-s N.Y.C. CiviL CouRT Acr 404, commentary 103
(1963).
10 The permissible constitutional limits of long-arm jurisdiction are laid
down in Hanson v. Denclda, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958); McGee v. Inter-
national Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
'11 29A McKiNNY's N.Y.C. CIV. COURT Acr 404, commentary 103
(1963).
1220 N.Y.2d 903, 232 N.E.2d 864, 286 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1967), aff'g 26 App.
Div. 2d 52, 270 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1st Dep't 1966).
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